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NOTES
THE CASE AGAINST
INSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE
Spencer L. Durland*
INTRODUCTION
In the United States today, federal laws immunize healthcare
providers who refuse, on moral or religious grounds, to perform or
assist in performing certain procedures. These "conscience clauses"
cover not just individual providers, but institutions as well. Catholic
hospitals' are chief among those institutions receiving conscience pro-
tection. Catholic hospitals operate in accordance with the Ethical and
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services ("Directives"), promul-
gated by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB).2 The
Directives define Catholic healthcare's mission of caring for the under-
served and also limit or prohibit particular medical treatments,
including abortion, tubal ligation, vasectomy, advance directives, and
other end-of-life procedures. 3 Catholic hospitals assert the right, as an
entity, to act in accord with the Directives, which are deemed to be a
hospital's conscience. Further, all employees must comply with the
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2012. I would like to
thank Notre Dame Law School Professors M. Cathleen Kaveny, 0. Carter Snead, and
Julian Velasco for their help. Any mistakes are my own.
1 This Note's argument applies equally well to any religious healthcare institu-
tion, but for reasons discussed below, Catholic healthcare institutions are particularly
important and relevant.
2 U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVEs
FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES 1 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter DIRECTIVEs], avail-
able at http://www.nccbuscc.org/meetings/2009Fall/docs/ERDs 5th-ed 091118_
FINAL.pdf.
3 See infra Part I.B.
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Directives.4 Therefore, the recognition of institutional conscience
restricts the full protection of individual conscience for those employ-
ees whose moral or religious persuasions diverge from the Directives.
That restriction is possible because a Catholic hospital's con-
science overrides individual conscience when the two conflict, some-
times causing practitioners serious dilemmas. In December of 2000, a
Catholic hospital asked its Chief of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Dr.
Yogendra Shah, to step down from that position because he per-
formed abortions at a private clinic. 5 In March of 1998, a Roman
Catholic hospital in New York forced Dr. David Mesches out of his
position as Chairman of the Department of Family Medicine. 6 In an
attempt to ensure the completion of a merger between one Catholic
and two secular hospitals, Dr. Mesches had offered to lease space in
his offices as a clinic to provide the reproductive services that the sur-
viving hospital would no longer offer. 7 Dr. Mesches commented to a
local newspaper that the right to an abortion is "the law of the land"
and added "it's the right thing to do."8 He was afterwards dismissed. 9
A recent article, which published the results of thirty interviews
with obstetrician-gynecologists who described their experiences treat-
ing miscarriages in Catholic hospitals, documented the challenge
faced by those who work in Catholic hospitals and struggle to abide by
the Directives.10 Dr. S, who used to work in an urban Catholic hospital
in the Northeast, described the following situation:
I'll never forget this; it was awful-I had one of my partners accept
this patient at 19 weeks. The pregnancy was in the vagina. It was
over .... And so he takes this patient and transferred her to [our]
4 See DiEcTIVEs, supra note 2, pmbl. at 4 (stating that the Directives provide
"authoritative guidance on certain moral issues" to "sponsors, trustees, administrators,
chaplains, physicians, health care personnel, and patients"); id. Directive 5, at 12
("Catholic health care services must adopt these Directives as policy [and] require
adherence to them within the institution as a condition for medical privileges and
employment .... ").
5 See Leora Eisenstadt, Separation of Church and Hospital: Strategies to Protect Pro-
Choice Physicians in Religiously Affiliated Hospitals, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 135, 136
(2003); Heather Ratcliffe, Doctor Who Does Abortions at Clinic Is Demoted by Catholic Hos-
pital: But He Will Stay on Staff at St. Elizabeth's in Granite City, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Dec. 21, 2000, at B2.
6 See Eisenstadt, supra note 5, at 136.
7 See id.
8 Id. at 136-37.
9 See id. at 137.
10 See generally Lori R. Freedman et al., When There's a Heartbeat: Miscarriage Man-
agement in Catholic-Owned Hospitals, 98 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1774 (2008) (recounting
the experiences of obstetrician-gynecologists in Catholic hospitals).
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tertiary medical center, which I was just livid about, and, you know,
"we're going to save the pregnancy." So of course, I'm on call when
she gets septic, and she's septic to the point that I'm pushing pres-
sors on labor and delivery trying to keep her blood pressure up, and
I have her on a cooling blanket because she's 106 degrees. And I
needed to get everything out. And so I put the ultrasound machine
on and there was still a heartbeat, and [the ethics committee]
wouldn't let me because there was still a heartbeat. This woman is
dying before our eyes. I went in to examine her, and I was able to
find the umbilical cord through the membranes and just snapped
the umbilical cord and so that I could put the ultrasound-"Oh
look. No heartbeat. Let's go." She was so sick she was in the
[intensive care unit] for about 10 days and very nearly died.... She
was in DIC [disseminated intravascular coagulpathy].... Her bleed-
ing was so bad that the sclera, the white of her eyes, were red, filled
with blood.... And I said, "I just can't do this. I can't put myself
behind this. This is not worth it to me." That's why I left."'
Dr. G, a physician at a southern Catholic hospital, described this
situation:
She was 14 weeks and the membranes were literally out of the cervix
and hanging in the vagina. And so with her I could just take care of
it in the [emergency room] but her cervix wasn't open enough...
so we went to the operating room and the nurse kept asking me,
"Was there heart tones, was there heart tones?" I said "I don't
know. I don't know." Which I kind of knew there would be. But
she said, "Well, did you check?" . I said, "I don't need an ultra-
sound to tell me that it's inevitable ... you can just put, 'The heart
tones weren't documented,' and then they can interpret that how-
ever they want to interpret that." ... I said, "Throw it back at me...
I'm not going to order an ultrasound. It's silly."'
2
Dr. H, at a midwest Catholic hospital, discussed sending a patient
ninety miles away by ambulance to get treatment after the hospital's
ethics committee denied her case1 3:
She was very early, 14 weeks. She came in ... and there was a hand
sticking out of the cervix. Clearly the membranes had ruptured and
she was trying to deliver .... There was a heart rate, and [we called]
the ethics committee, and they [said], "Nope, can't do anything."
So we had to send her to [the university hospital].... You know,
these things don't happen that often, but from what I understand it,
11 Id. at 1777 (alterations in original).
12 Id. (alterations in original).
13 See id. at 1776.
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it's pretty clear. Even if mom is very sick, you know, potentially life
threatening, can't do anything. 14
Cases like these, which present difficult moral or ethical ques-
tions, are likely infrequent and do not, in themselves, justify the adop-
tion or rejection of any public policy. Rather, they are valuable
because they better illustrate the fundamental issue driving the more
routine instances of conflict between individual and institutional con-
science, 15 which, although less serious, have no less moral validity.
Conscience clauses permit a section of the populace to opt out
from the application of a law that would ordinarily have universal
application. This is too serious an enterprise to rest on an unsteady
theoretical foundation. As Dr. Edmund D. Pellegrino writes, the com-
plexity of the ethical issues presented "is significant because once the
ethical issues are expressed in law, the debate may be reduced to
instrumental and procedural details that cannot resolve underlying
moral sources of controversy.' 1 6 Yet the justification for institutional
conscience has not been rigorously tested and scrutiny reveals signifi-
cant flaws. If individual conscience is to be protected, then it must be
a complete recognition of individual conscience-a recognition
which includes not just the right of refusal, but also a physician's right
to make medical decisions consistent with her ethical code and pre-
vailing medical standards, unhindered by an institution's assertion of
conscience.
The right of conscience is rooted in autonomy, an interest that
patients and doctors share. As a necessary precursor to autonomous
decision making, patients have an informational right as well. The
goal is to lessen (or, ideally, eliminate) the gap between the patient's
and doctor's understanding of the medical condition and available
treatment options, empowering the patient to make an informed deci-
sion. At the same time, a physician has a moral right to refuse to
recommend or perform medical interventions that conflict with her
moral or religious principles. Conscience clauses explicitly protect
this interest. But this is only part of the physician's right of con-
science. A physician also has a powerful interest in affirmatively pro-
viding medically indicated care as dictated by her clinical morality
17
14 Id. (alterations in original).
15 A recent study found that nineteen percent of physicians who had worked in a
religiously affiliated hospital experienced conflict with the institution's patient care
policies. SeeJennifer Harper, Doctors Report Religious Conflicts at Some Hospitals: Obliga-
tion to Patients at Issue, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, at A6.
16 Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Physician's Conscience, Conscience Clauses, and Relig-
ious Belief: A Catholic Perspective, 30 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 221, 222 (2002).
17 I use this term to refer to a physician's ethics as applied in a clinical context.
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and prevailing medical standards.' 8 Conscience clauses fail to ade-
quately protect this interest. In fact, the expansion of conscience
clauses to include institutions-commonly Catholic hospitals' 9-
undercuts the affirmative aspect of individual conscience by requiring
physicians to refrain from acting in accord with their clinical morality
or prevailing best practices if doing so would violate the institution's
conscience.
Institutional conscience is fundamentally different from individ-
ual conscience but is mistakenly treated in legislation 20 and academic
discussion 21 as equivalent. Legal fiction aside, a hospital is not a per-
son; it is a physical structure within which providers give medical care.
It does not perform procedures or counsel patients. It does not take
lunch hours or vacations. And it does not have a conscience. In prac-
tice, institutional conscience serves as a trump card whenever (and to
the extent that) the institution's religious principles diverge froffi the
physician's own religious or ethical principles. Such an arrangement
is illogical and unwise, and must be remedied by limiting conscience
clause protection to individuals.
In Part I of this Note, I discuss the pattern of hospital mergers in
the 1980s and 1990s and the part played by Catholic healthcare insti-
tutions. Catholicism's substantial presence in modern healthcare is of
particular importance because of the sectarian framework (the Direc-
tives) which guides the operation of Catholic hospitals. The Directives
embody both Catholic healthcare's uncontroversial mission to minis-
ter to the underserved and their more divisive policies, which limit or
completely ban particular procedures inconsistent with Catholic
teaching. Catholic healthcare's growth creates new possibilities for
conflict between the Directives' edicts and individual conscience.
Part II recounts the shift from a strong recognition of physician
autonomy toward today's strong protection of patient autonomy. To
provide the groundwork for a discussion of conscience, I posit four
characteristics of conscience: (1) conscience is inherently human; (2)
conscience reflects a private, internal judgment; (3) conscience is
18 C.f Michael P. Moreland, Institutional Conscience and Moral Dilemmas: Why "Free-
dom of Conscience" Is Bad for "Church Autonomy, " 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 217, 227
(2009) ("[A] physician might be legally obligated in some cases-but is at least
required by the standards of her profession-to respect her patient's autonomy and
to offer ... all legally available and professionally accepted services.").
19 See Susan Berke Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Religious Beliefs and Healthcare Neces-
sities: Can They Coexist?, 30 HUM. RTS. 8, 8 (2003) ("Catholic institutions control ...
the largest single group of nonprofit hospitals.").
20 See infra Part II.B.
21 See infra Part III.
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predicated on recognition of the autonomous moral agent; and (4)
conscience compels a person to act or refrain from acting. The pro-
tection of these same characteristics in other aspects of American law
helps explain the existence of conscience legislation. Part II then
details the birth and growth of conscience clauses that check, some-
what, the rising tide of patient autonomy. Part II concludes with a
discussion of the degree to which conscience clauses protect clinical
morality.
In Part III, I test the strength of arguments for institutional con-
science against those opposing it. I conclude first that institutional
conscience is dubious in the abstract, as it does not serve the justifica-
tions for recognizing rights of conscience in the first place and is dif-
ferent in kind from individual conscience. Furthermore, institutional
conscience is indefensible as a trump over individual conscience,
played by those who would otherwise have no place in medical deci-
sion making. It is this latter characteristic of institutional conscience
that is most objectionable.
I conclude in Part IV that the best way to remedy this problem is
to redefine "healthcare provider" in conscience legislation to exclude
institutions. Although the text of the Church Amendment,22 the first
federal conscience clause, appears to provide the protection needed,
courts have foreclosed this option by holding that the Church Amend-
ment provides no private right of action. 23 The charitable trust doc-
trine is likewise a flawed solution because only public officials or those
with a special interest have standing to bring suit.24 Beyond the indi-
vidual difficulties posed by each of these solutions, neither addresses
the problem at its core. In this case, the simplest solution is the best.
The notion of institutional conscience must simply be dropped from
conscience legislation.25
22 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006).
23 See infra note 163.
24 See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
25 In writing this Note, I hope to avoid adding to the mass of politically
entrenched pseudo-scholarship whose purpose is to proclaim, rather than discuss. I
do not write from a pro-Catholic or anti-Catholic perspective. Other major religions
have rules regarding the provision of medical care, but the prevalence of healthcare
institutions under Catholic control, and the detailed rules which guide them, bring
my discussion out of the theoretical sphere into grounded relevance. My purpose is
to question the law as it stands, specifically the recognition of institutional conscience,
which I believe is unfaithful to the underlying justification for recognizing healthcare
providers' right of conscience.
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I. THE STATE OF CATHOLIC HEALTHCARE
A. Merger Mania
These issues are no mere academic exercise. In every Catholic
hospital lurks the possibility of conflict between institutional and indi-
vidual conscience. Catholicism has a long history of involvement with
American healthcare 26 and retains a substantial presence, despite the
turmoil of the past three decades. The 1980s saw a rash of hospital
mergers27 spurred by a shift from a fee-for-service structure to man-
aged care, 28 along with reduced Medicare payouts and heated compe-
tition. 29 During this decade, Catholic hospitals generally merged with
each other.3 0 In the 1990s, when the Clinton Administration's push
for healthcare reform further galvanized mergers and affiliations to
protect against "anticipated economic shifts,"'' l Catholic hospitals rec-
ognized that, to stay competitive, they would need to merge with non-
religious hospitals. 32 Between 1990 and 1998, there were 127 mergers
between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals. 33 As one hospital board
26 See Jason M. Kellhofer, Note, The Misperception and Misapplication of the First
Amendment in the American Pluralistic System: Mergers Between Catholic and Non-Catholic
Healthcare Systems, 16J.L. & HEALTH 103, 114-15 (2001-2002) (describing the Catho-
lic Church's early medical work in the United States).
27 See id. at 105.
28 See id. (describing "managed care" as "coordinat[ing] all heath care services
an individual receives in order to maximize benefits and minimize cost").
29 See Kimberly A. Parr, Note, Beyond Politics: A Social and Cultural History of Federal
Healthcare Conscience Protections, 35 Am. J.L. & MED. 620, 635 (2009) ("[E] ntities strug-
gled in the face of a changing economic climate triggered by decreased Medicare
provider payouts and increased competition.").
30 See id. at 635 (noting that during the merger trend of the' 1980s, "Catholic
hospitals typically merged with other Catholic hospitals"); see also Eisenstadt, supra
note 5, at 138 ("As a further solution to the financial difficulties experienced by many
health care institutions, Catholic hospitals have begun to merge with one another
. . . ."1).
31 See Lisa C. Ikemoto, When a Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47 MERGER L. REv. 1087,
1093 (1996). Even after President Clinton's national health-care reform effort failed,
health organizations continued to consolidate. See id.
32 See Parr, supra note 29, at 635-36; see also Eisenstadt, supra note 5, at 138 ("In
the past ten years, 'almost 170 non-Catholic hospitals have merged or otherwise affili-
ated with Catholic health care entities."' (quoting NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., Hospi-
TAL MERGERS AND THE THREAT TO WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES 6
(2001))); Kellhofer, supra note 26, at 107 ("To remain a competitive force, Catholic
hospitals have merged with non-Catholic hospitals."). In order to give guidance to
hospitals in this new endeavor, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops
amended the Directives and formed the Ad Hoc Committee on Health Care Issues and
the Church. See Ikemoto, supra note 31, at 1094.
33 See Parr, supra note 29, at 636.
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member put it, "'[w]e woke up and realized the big issue was
survival." 34
Catholic hospitals have done more than simply survive. As the
pace of mergers slowed,3 5 the dust settled to reveal an expansive Cath-
olic presence. By 2004, Catholic institutions controlled twenty per-
cent of the nation's hospital beds.36 In 2009, there were 624 Catholic
hospitals nationwide 37 and Catholic health systems accounted for
eleven of the forty largest systems in the United States.38 Most strik-
ingly, Catholic hospitals are often sole community providers-hospi-
tals without a like provider nearby.39 That fact is of particular concern
to advocates for increased access to reproductive services, 40 because in
those situations, community access is defined by the scope of services
the hospital is willing to offer.
B. The Directives
The Directives are binding upon Catholic hospitals and all of their
employees.41 Their purpose is to "reaffirm the ethical standards in
health care that flow from the Church's teaching about the dignity of
34 Kellhofer, supra note 26, at 108 (quoting HARRY NELSON & ANN F. MONROE,
MILBANK MEM'L FUND, CONVERTING AND MERGING HOSPITALS (1999), available at
http://www.milbank.org/reports/mrtrustees.html).
35 Id. at 111.
36 See Kristin M. Roshelli, Note, Religiously Based Discrimination: Striking a Balance
Between a Health Care Provider's Right to Religious Freedom and a Woman's Ability to Access
Fertility Treatment Without Facing Discrimination, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 977, 985 (2009).
37 See Health Care Reform Facts and Statistics, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS, http://
www.nccbuscc.org/healthcare/facts.shtml (last visited June 20, 2011).
38 See id.
39 See Eisenstadt, supra note 5, at 137-38. By 1996, the Health Care Financing
Administration had identified forty-six Catholic hospitals as "sole community provid-
ers." See Ikemoto, supra note 31, at 1092 (quoting 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.90, 412.92
(2010)).
40 See William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations upon Autonomous
Moral Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 455, 485
(2001) ("The consolidation of rural and small community hospitals poses . ..
problems of restricted choice . . . ."); Susan Berke Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saving
Roe Is Not Enough: When Religion Controls Healthcare, 31 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 725, 734
(2004) ("These restrictions are felt especially strongly in rural areas."); see alsoJane
Hochberg, Note, The Sacred Heart Story: Hospital Mergers and Their Effects on Reproductive
Rights, 75 OR. L. REV. 945, 954 (1996) (describing the creation of a Catholic sole
provider as a defacto elimination of services).
41 See DimEcriVEs, supra note 2, Directive 5, at 12 ("Catholic health care services
must adopt these Directives as policy, require adherence to them within the institu-
tion as a condition for medical privileges and employment, and provide appropriate
instruction regarding the Directives for administration, medical and nursing staff, and
other personnel.").
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the human person" and to "provide authoritative guidance on certain
moral issues that face Catholic health care today. '42 The overarching
mission of Catholic institutions is to care for society's marginalized
populations.43 The controversy lies not in that goal, but in the type of
care that the Directives prescribe. A Catholic hospital will not honor
an advance directive that conflicts with Catholic teaching.44 A rape
victim is not permitted to receive emergency contraception without
evidence that conception has not occurred. 45 Certain types of fertili-
zation are limited.46 Abortion, as defined by the Directives,4 7 is prohib-
ited, 48 as is surrogacy,49 contraception, 50 and sterilization. 51 It is these
restrictions and prohibitions that concern some community members
when secular and Catholic hospitals seek to merge. 52
Catholic hospitals generally insist on retaining the Directives when
merging with secular hospitals, 53 though sometimes creative com-
42 Id. pmbl., at 4.
43 See id. Directive 3, at 11 (calling on Catholic institutions to give particular care
to "the poor; the uninsured and the underinsured; children and the unborn; single
parents; the elderly; those with incurable diseases and chemical dependencies; racial
minorities; immigrants and refugees"). For example, during the beginning of the
AIDS crisis in the 1980s, Catholic hospitals filled a void left by other institutions and
providers. SeeJohn J. Coughlin, Catholic Health Care and the Diocesan Bishop, 40 CATH.
LAW. 85, 88 (2000) (describing Catholic healthcare institutions' role in combating the
spread of AIDS).
44 See DIRECTIVES, supra note 2, Directive 24, at 19.
45 See id. Directive 36, at 21-22.
46 See id. Directives 40-41, at 25.
47 See id. Directive 45, at 26.
48 See id.
49 See id. Directive 42, at 26.
50 See id. Directive 52, at 27.
51 See id. Directive 53, at 27.
52 See, e.g., Steve Chambers, Merger Pits Care and Doctrine, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), May 16, 1999, at 1 (reporting on a hospital merger, after which the city's only
hospital "will stop performing abortions, tubal ligations, vasectomies and all contra-
ceptive counseling"); Anne Constable, Merger Questions Linger, Despite Promises, SANTE
FE NEW MExICAN, Dec. 22, 2007, at Al (noting wariness over a Medical Center's part-
nership with a Catholic health system); Cliff Peale, St. Luke to Cut Services for Merger,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 14, 2008, at B3 (describing efforts to pass on to a commu-
nity foundation those services that will no longer be offered when a Catholic and non-
Catholic hospital merge).
53 See Parr, supra note 29, at 636. A survey found that, in seventeen percent of
cases in which Catholic and secular hospitals merged, there was no overall loss of
services; thirty-one percent of such mergers resulted in a complete loss of reproduc-
tive choice. SeeJoyce Gelb & ColleenJ. Shogan, Community Activism in the USA: Catho-
lic Hospital Mergers and Reproductive Access, 4 Soc. MOVEMENT STUD. 209, 211 (2005).
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promises are reached.54 The Church hierarchy has significant control
over mergers, as the Vatican must authorize any agreement involving
more than one million dollars in Church assets. 55 For example, in
1998 the Vatican stopped a proposed merger "in part because the
Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital would have continued to
perform abortions and other reproductive surgeries." 56 After getting
the Vatican's blessing, merger agreements must also be approved by
the diocesan bishop.57 The diocesan bishop is also empowered to
interpret the Directives promulgated by the USCCB.58 As a result,
application of the Directives varies between dioceses. 59 For example,
Brackenridge Hospital in Austin, Texas, despite being under Catholic
management, provided sterilizations and birth control through unaf-
filiated employees as per an agreement with city officials. 60 At the
other end of the spectrum, in Phoenix, Arizona, Bishop Thomas J.
Olmstead decided that a nun who, in her capacity as head of the hos-
pital's ethics committee approved an emergency abortion necessary to
save a mother's life, was automatically excommunicated. 61 Thus, in a
Catholic hospital the Vatican, the USCCB, and the diocesan bishop all
54 See Cathleen F. Crowley, Merger Creates Health Giant, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Feb.
26, 2009, at Al ("To continue offering reproductive services not allowed under Catho-
lic rules, Samaritan Hospital will create a separately owned 'hospital within a hospital'
that will provide tubal ligations, vasectomies and other services."); see also infra note 60
and accompanying text (discussing a compromise between Brackenridge Hospital
and the city of Austin, Texas).
55 See Ikemoto, supra note 31, at 1097.
56 Chambers, supra note 52, at 1.
57 See DiREcrvEs, supra note 2, Directive 68, at 36.
58 See Leonard J. Nelson, III, God and Woman in the Catholic Hospital, 31 J. LEGIs.
69, 124 (2004) (noting the "increased emphasis on the role of the local bishop in
supervising health care institutions and on compliance with the [Directives]").
59 See Donald H.J. Hermann, Religious Identity and the Health Care Market: Mergers
and Acquisitions Involving Religiously Affiliated Providers, 34 CREIGHTON L. REv. 927, 958
(2001) ("Although each bishop is encouraged to follow [the] directives, guidelines
have had different interpretations and applications depending on the particular
bishop or hospital board involved."); Hochberg, supra note 40, at 954.
60 Rob Boston, Emergency! How a City-Owned Hospital in Florida Wound up Operating
Under the Catholic Bishops' Control-and What Americans United and Its Allies Are Doing
About It, CHURCH & ST., Oct. 2000, at 4. In response, conservative Catholic leaders
petitioned the Vatican, who named a more conservative replacement for the Austin
Archbishop who would soon retire. See id.
61 Jerry Filteau, Gray Areas of Excommunication: Canon Lawyers Assess 'Automatic'Pen-
alty for Nun Who Approved an Abortion, NAT'L CATH. REP.,June 25, 2010, at 8, available at
http://ncronline.org/news/faith-parish/gray-areas-excommunication. Not all canon
lawyers and theologians agreed with the Bishop's interpretation of the Directives. See
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figure prominently in determining the range of care available to
patients.
When negotiating a merger, a Catholic institution is unlikely to
compromise in any dispute regarding the provision of services that the
Vatican forbids. Reverend F. Patrick Hanser stated the position as fol-
lows: "If we would have had to compromise any of our ethical or relig-
ious values or our Catholic identity, it would have been better for us to
close." 62 In light of this stance, something-is-better-than-nothing logic
makes it improbable that a secular hospital would be willing to go
under rather than agree to a limitation on the services it provides.
The contested services are also infrequently provided, giving sec-
ular hospitals another reason not to insist on retaining them. As one
hospital executive put it, "you have to remember that this is a very
small portion of our business right now. And in terms of proportion-
ality, there are so many more benefits to the community [from a]
merger despite the unfortunate loss to some. '63 In other words, for
cash-strapped hospitals, the contested services do not generate
enough revenue to justify turning down a merger in order to protect
them. Thus, when Catholic and secular hospitals merge, Catholic
entrenchment and multidimensional economic considerations push
secular institutions to assent to retaining the Directives.
So where does this leave doctors? Catholic hospital employees
are caught at the confluence of their own consciences, the patient's
right to be informed, the dictates of prevailing best practices, and the
Directives' demands. Of course, Catholic hospitals require their
employees to abide by the Directives.64 Some merged hospitals even
require doctors to sign an agreement promising to comply with Cath-
olic moral teachings. 65 But, as noted above, compliance can exact a
heavy cost. 66
62 Charles Ornstein, Hospital Mergers Tread Fine Line Between Religion, Economics,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 14, 1998, at 1H.
63 Esther B. Fein, Hospital Deals Raise Concern on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
1997, at B.
64 DIEcIVEs, supra note 2, Directive 5, at 12 ("Catholic health care services must
adopt these Directives as policy, require adherence to them within the institution as a
condition for medical privileges and employment, and provide appropriate instruc-
tion regarding the Directives for administration, medical and nursing staff, and other
personnel.").
65 See Monica Sloboda, Note, The High Cost of Merging with a Religiously-Controlled
Hospital, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 140, 143 (2001).
66 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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II. AUTONOMY IN MEDICINE
A. Autonomy Ascendant
On one conception, autonomy 67 is a right to be recognized as an
independent moral agent whose judgments, freely made, are worthy
of respect. 68 Choice making is an intrinsically human act, so that
infringements on autonomous choice are infringements on an aspect
of one's humanity and thus inspire suspicion.6 9 However, constraints
on patient autonomy were not always mistrusted. For centuries, a
paternalistic approach to medicine reigned in the United States.
70 It
was "considered the duty of physicians to decide what was best
because the patient lacked medical knowledge and might lose hope if
he knew the whole truth about his options or prognosis. '7 1 It was not
until the mid-1960s that paternalistic medicine came under fire as an
infringement on patients' self-determination 72 and patient autonomy
gained increasing respect.73 Because freedom of choice is a hollow
right without access to relevant information, the doctrine of informed
consent emerged as the primary vehicle for mitigating the power dis-
parity between doctors and their patients.74 As the Maryland
Supreme Court stated, informed consent was adopted as a
requirement
primarily to enable the patient to make an informed choice about a
particular therapy or procedure so that healthcare providers did not
substitute their own judgment for that of the patient's .... Thus, we
recognized that personal autonomy and personal choice were the
primary foundations of the informed consent doctrine.
75
67 The term "autonomy" itself is not without controversy. I adopt here Dr.
Edmund Pellegrino's description of "an autonomous person [as] one who, in his
thoughts, words, and actions, is able to follow those norms he chooses as his own
without external constraints or coercion by others." Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient
and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relation-
ship, 10J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47, 48 (1994).
68 See id.
69 See id. at 48-49.
70 See id. at 50.
71 Id.
72 See Farr A. Curlin et al., Religion, Conscience, and Controversial Clinical Practices,
356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 593, 598-99 (2007).
73 See Pellegrino, supra note 67, at 49. Pellegrino identifies the confluence of
improved public education, the civil rights movement, and generalized suspicion of
authority claims as the catalysts for the change. See id.
74 See Steven I. Addlestone, Note, Liability for Improper Maintenance of Life Support:
Balancing Patient and Physician Autonomy, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1255, 1257-58 (1993).
75 McQuitty v. Spangler, 976 A.2d 1020, 1031 (Md. 2009); see also Cruzan ex rel.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) ("The doctrine of
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Today, patient autonomy is ascendant, 76 and though widely
applauded as a general matter, some criticize the deference to patient
autonomy for transforming physicians from moral agents into vendors
of medical services. 77 The situation creates a conflict for individual
providers who may find themselves obliged by their clinical morality
and prevailing best practices to inform a patient of her full range of
options while obliged by sectarian command not to materially cooper-
ate with a sinful course of treatment. Conscience clauses attempt to
address this friction.
B. Conscience Codified
1. The Nature of Conscience and Why We Recognize
Conscientious Objection
Conscience clauses are now commonplace fixtures in American
legislation. The federal government was the first to recognize the
rights of medical providers to refuse to participate in medical treat-
ment, even if medically indicated, when doing so would conflict with a
moral or religious belief.78 Many states followed its lead.79 Federal
conscience laws originally referred to "religious beliefs or moral con-
viction," 80 but some later conscience clauses dropped such limiting
informed consent arose in recognition of the value society places on a person's auton-
omy and as the primary vehicle by which a person can protect the integrity of his
body."); In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 454 (N.J. 1987) ("In medical treatment decisions,
the law developed the doctrine of informed consent as the primary means for protect-
ing the right of self-determination.").
76 SeeJudith F. Daar, Medical Futility and Implications for Physician Autonomy, 21 AM.
J.L. & MED. 221, 223 (1995) ("Over the past two decades the bioethics movement has
done much to advance the realities of patient autonomy, at least as revealed by the
written laws of our country."). Some argue that the pendulum has tipped too far
toward patient autonomy. See, e.g., Pellegrino, supra note 67, at 59-61 (enumerating
the problems that arise when physicians become mere dispensaries of medicine and
medical services).
77 See Curlin et al., supra note 72, at 599; see also Pellegrino, supra note 16, at
223-25 (discussing the "shift in the locus of decision-making from the physician to
the patient or her surrogate").
78 See Health Programs Extension Act of 1973 (Church Amendment), Pub. L. No.
93-45, § 401, 87 Stat. 91, 95-96 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)
(2006)).
79 For example, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Maine,
Mississippi, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington all protect, to varying degrees,
pharmacists' refusal to fill certain prescriptions. See Pharmacist Conscience Clauses: Laws
and Legislation, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?
tabid=14380 (last updated Feb. 2011).
80 See Health Programs Extension Act § 401.
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language. 81 The scope of state protections varies-some states protect
only those refusals founded in religious belief but many do not.82
In general, a society cannot have two equally valid codes of law.83
If anyone may simply disregard legal obligations based on a claimed
religious or moral belief, sincerely held or not, then law is a sugges-
tion, not a command, and anarchy is our reward.8 4 All members of a
community must forego some of their freedom in order to enjoy the
benefits of ordered society.8 5 It is a serious thing to grant exemptions
from the supremacy of secular law and they must be carefully limited.
81 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, §§ 507-508,
121 Stat. 1844, 2208-09 (2007); 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2006).
82 See Leslie C. Griffin, Conscience and Emergency Contraception, 6 Hous. J. HEALTH
L. & POLY 299, 302 (2006) (discussing state legislation following, and modeled on,
the Church Amendment).
83 See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885, 888 (1990) ("To make an individ-
ual's obligation to obey . . . a [generally applicable] law contingent upon the law's
coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling'
• . . contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense. . . . Any society
adopting such a system would be courting anarchy .. "); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) ("Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because
of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself. Government would exist only in name under such cir-
cumstances."). The care taken to divide power in the Constitution between state and
federal governments, and to prescribe when one overrules the other, illustrates this
point. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
84 Indeed, Piero Tozzi, who vehemently criticized "Catholics being affirmatively
excluded from full participation in civic life," admits this point when he writes: "To
state things bluntly, the question is not whether values or morality exist and whether
they are to be imposed ... but rather, whose values or whose morality (or amorality)
is to be imposed." Piero A. Tozzi, The Blessing or the Curse: Whose Values Will Guide Us?
Where Will They Lead Us?, 47J. CATH. LEGAL. STUD. 167, 172, 174 (2008). To recognize
that one set of values or the other must triumph is to admit their mutual exclusivity.
85 Thomas Hobbes described the state of humanity without such a compromise as
"a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man," where there are "no Arts;
no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of vio-
lent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 186 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651). In
order "to erect ... a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the inva-
sion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another . . . [that] they may nourish
themselves and live contentedly," human beings must "conferre all their power and
strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their
Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will .... " Id. at 227; see also THOMAS PAINE,
COMMON SENSE 1-2 (Wiley Book Co. 1942) (1792) (asserting that "were the impulses
of conscience clear, uniform, and irresistibly obeyed, man would need no other law-
giver," but because that is not so, man "finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his
property to furnish means for the protection of the rest"-this security is "the true
design and end of government").
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Conscience clauses are just such exemptions and therefore ought to
be warily endorsed, and then only after a thorough vetting. Con-
science clauses should be evaluated with an eye toward the purposes
that justify their existence. Conscience rights must be rejected the
instant they fail to serve these purposes.
Any attempt to define or characterize conscience risks descend-
ing into a morass of philosophy, ethics, and morals from which one
might never return. However, without some working description, fur-
ther discussion lacks foundation. Conscience is predicated on the rec-
ognition of the autonomous moral agent.86 Choice precedes action.
In order to choose to act rightly or wrongly, a person must have first
defined for herself what is right or wrong. For that reason, there is
something deeply human about conscience.8 7 As Kevin Seamus Has-
son writes, " [c] onscience is the interior, quintessentially human voice
that speaks to us of goodness and duty, the voice we must obey if we
are to keep our integrity. It counsels doing good and avoiding evil,
and serves as a referee to rule on which is which."88 Professor Steven
D. Smith states that "when we describe an act as being done from
'conscience' we usually mean at least to say that the person in ques-
tion acted on the basis of a sincere conviction about what is morally
required or forbidden. '89
Dr. Pellegrino describes the conscientious person as "striv[ing] to
preserve moral integrity."90 He continues: "This requires that their
external behavior be congruent with their conscience's internal dic-
tates about what they take to be morally right and feel compelled to
86 See Moreland, supra note 18, at 225.
87 SeeJohn Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, inJOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT AND A LETrER CONCERNING TOLERATION 173 (Sterling P. Lamprecht ed.
1937) (1690) ("And such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be com-
pelled into belief of anything by outward force."); Pellegrino, supra note 16, at 228
("[C]onscience clauses are firmly rooted in what it is to be a human person morally,
intellectually, and psychologically. Every individual, by virtue of being human, has a
moral claim to the free exercise of conscience.").
88 KEVIN S-Amus HASSON, THE RIGHT TO BE WRONG 14 (2005); see also LOCKE,
supra note 87 ("No way whatsoever that I shall walk in, against the Dictates of my
Conscience, will ever bring me to the Mansions of the Blessed.") Locke's letter con-
templated conscience based in religion, but the logic of his argument extends into
the secular realm. See Ronald Beiner, Three Versions of the Politics of Conscience: Hobbes,
Spinoza, Locke, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1107, 1121 (2010).
89 Steven D. Smith, The Tenuous Case for Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
325, 328 (2005).
90 Pellegrino, supra note 16, at 221.
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do."9 1 Mr. Hasson agrees, writing "conscience requires action, not
just conviction. It demands that we live according to the truth as we
know it." 9 2 For John Locke, the "law of conscience" was a judgment
that "lays a bond on the mind."9 3 Synthesizing these varied (and by
no means exhaustive) descriptions renders four touchstones of con-
science: (1) conscience is inherently human; (2) conscience reflects a
private, internal judgment; (3) conscience is predicated on recogni-
tion of the autonomous moral agent; and (4) conscience compels a
person to act or refrain from acting.
These characteristics help explain the law's willingness to protect
conscience, as they are the basis for other familiar legal principles.
Independence-respect for the autonomous moral agent-is a princi-
ple long treasured by the American legal system. 94 For example, the
retributive justification for punishment of crime is rooted in the idea
of the independent actor. 95 Consent's prominent place in tort law is a
further instance of the value placed upon individual autonomy.96
91 Id. As Sophocles put it: "There is no witness so terrible-no accuser so power-
ful as conscience which dwells within us." THE FORBES BOOK OF BUSINESS QUOTATIONS
138 (Ted Goodman ed., 90th Anniversary ed. 2006).
92 HASSON, supra note 88, at 14.
93 JOHN LoCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE 185 (W. Von Leyden ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1965) (1663).
94 See, e.g., Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000) ("[A]ny indi-
vidual right to self-representation on appeal based on autonomy principles must be
grounded in the Due Process Clause."); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisex-
ual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) ("[T]his use of the State's power violates
the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has
the autonomy to choose the content of his own message."); Robert E. Toone, The
Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REv. 621, 650-51 (2005) ("The idea of
autonomy has acquired considerable popularity in the United States and other west-
ern societies .... [It has] become central to the Supreme Court's constitutional
jurisprudence.").
95 See, e.g., Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of
Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CAlIF. L. REV. 907, 931 (2010) ("Retributive punish-
ment for legal wrongdoing is justified in part because, in treating the offender as a
responsible moral agent, it communicates to him a respect for his dignity as an auton-
omous moral agent."); John A. Powell & Stephen M. Menendian, Remaking Law: Mov-
ing Beyond Enlightenment Jurisprudence, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1035, 1061 (2010) ("[T]he
theory of blame and punishment continues to rest on notions of free choice by auton-
omous, rational actors. The heat of passion 'defense' is another application of this
theory of culpability .... (footnote omitted)).
96 See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Value of Consumer Choice in Products Liability, 74
BROOKLYN L. REv. 781, 781 ("The role of consent within tort law derives from the
value of individual autonomy or self-determination."). This is particularly true in the
medical context. See Margo Kaplan, "A Special Class of Persons ": Pregnant Women's Right
to Refuse Medical Treatment After Gonzales v. Cahart, 13 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 145, 163 n.72
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Also, the law often seeks to protect those aspects of life that are private
or internal, or reflect our inherent dignity as humans.97 Compulsions
to act or not act sometimes excuse liability in defenses such as duress98
or defense of habitation.99 Since conscience has characteristics that
the law protects in other contexts, it is not surprising that lawmakers
developed protections for provider conscience when they believed it
to be under attack.
2. Conscience Clauses: Legal Protection for Provider Conscience
The first federal conscience clause emerged in response to a
Montana district court's ruling in Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital,100
enjoining a Catholic hospital from interfering with a planned tubal
ligation 1 I because, by receiving federal funding, it had become a
(2010) ("Tort law recognizes [the value in meaningful choice] by holding a health
care provider who does not obtain informed consent before treating a patient liable
because the provider has intruded on the bodily autonomy of the individual."); Lars
Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental Ther-
apy, 28 Am. J.L. & MED. 361, 364 (2002) (noting that "informed consent doctrine
emerged from the intentional tort of battery" and "reflects a commitment to patient
autonomy and self-determination").
97 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) ("[A]dults may choose to
enter upon [a] relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives
and still retain their dignity as free persons .... The liberty protected by the Constitu-
tion allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice."); McKaskle v. Wiggins,
465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984) ("The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity
and autonomy of the accused and to allow the presentation of what may... be the
accused's best possible defense." (emphasis in original)). Fourth Amendment cases
often invoke a conglomerate of human dignity, privacy, and security interests. See
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) ("[T]he knock-and-announce rule pro-
tects those elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden
entrance."); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) ("[T]he rea-
sons that might support a requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly
intrusive searches of the person-dignity and privacy interests of the person being
searched-simply do not carry over to vehicles."); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 769-70 (1966) ("The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that the desired
evidence might be obtained.").
98 R CHtARDJ. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAw 479 (2d ed. 2004) ("Traditionally, the
duress defense has been the main device by which the law takes into account external
constraints on a person's capacity to choose to comply with the law.").
99 Id. at 428 ("Under [a] traditional common-law doctrine, a person was permit-
ted to use deadly force to prevent an entry into his or her home based on the reasona-
ble belief that such force was necessary to prevent robbery, burglary, arson, or
felonious assault.").
100 369 F. Supp. 948, 950-51 (D. Mont. 1973), affd, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975).
101 See H.R. REP. No. 93-227, at 11 (1973) ("The background for subsection (b) of
Section 401 of the [Health Programs Extension Act of 1973] is an injunction issued
2011]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
state actor.10 2 This holding came down in "an environment electrified
by the Roe [v. Wade] decision, one steeped in uncertainty as to the
effects of the Court's recognition of a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy before viability.' 1 0 3 Congress expressed its disagreement
with the Taylor court by passing the Church Amendment,10 4 which
states that an entity's or individual's receipt of federal funding does
not authorize a court or public authority to require that the entity or
individual perform sterilizations or abortions if doing so would violate
the individual's or entity's religious convictions. 10 5 The Church
Amendment also states that no entity that receives federal funding
may discriminate against physicians or other healthcare personnel
because they refuse to perform an abortion or sterilization due to
moral or religious convictions, or because they choose to perform an
abortion or sterilization. 10 6 The Church Amendment counterbal-
anced Roe's newly minted privacy right with a recognition that; for
providers, forced performance of sterilization and abortion can
intrude upon the personal arenas of conscience, morality, or religion.
But the Church Amendment's internal inconsistency sows the
seeds of further conflict. It permits a hospital to forbid its employees
from performing certain procedures based on conscientious objec-
tion, while simultaneously forbidding that same hospital from discrim-
inating against a physician who provides that treatment. Therefore,
although the discrimination prohibition strives to protect the full
range of individual conscience (i.e., the conscience of objectors and
non-objectors alike), the inclusion of protection for entities under-
mines this goal.
... in Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital.... The court enjoined St. Vincent's Hospital...
from prohibiting Mrs. Taylor's physician from performing in that hospital a steriliza-
tion procedure on her during the delivery of her baby by Caesarian section .... In
ruling on a motion to dismiss [a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit] for lack of jurisdiction, the
court stated [that the hospital's receipt of Hill-Burton Act funds supports the finding
of jurisdiction]."); see also Taylor, 369 F. Supp. at 950-51 (recounting issuance of a
preliminary injunction and its dissolution after new legislation prohibited the court
from deeming a hospital to be a state actor because it received Hill-Burton funds).
102 See Taylor, 369 F. Supp. at 950 n.1; see also Tom C.W. Lin, Treating an Unhealthy
Conscience: A Prescription for Medical Conscience Clauses, 31 VT. L. REV. 105, 107 (2006).
103 Parr, supra note 29, at 632.
104 See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006).
105 See Health Programs Extension Act of 1973 (Church Amendment), Pub. L. No.
93-45, § 401, 87 Stat. 91, 95-96 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)).
106 See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c).
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The 1990s saw a proliferation of conscience legislation,1 0 7 which
built upon the Church Amendment's inconsistency. In 1996, Con-
gress passed the Coats Amendment,10 8 "which prohibits the govern-
ment from 'discriminating' against medical residency programs or
other entities that lose accreditation because they fail to provide or
require training in abortion services."'1 9 In 1997, Congress sanc-
tioned Medicare and Medicaid managed care plans' refusal "to pro-
vide, reimburse for, or provide coverage of a counseling or referral
service if the . .. organization offering the plan . . . objects to the
provision of such service on moral or religious grounds."' 1 0 In 1999,
Congress exempted religiously affiliated health plans from a require-
ment that federal employees' health plans cover prescription contra-
ception."1 ' The Weldon Amendment, 112 a rider attached to the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, states that the funds it dis-
tributes are not meant to fund abortions, 113 though an exception is
made for abortions necessary to save a woman's life. 114 The Act fur-
ther prohibits the appropriation of funds to any federal agency or pro-
gram, or state or local government, that discriminates against a
healthcare entity on the ground that the entity refused to "provide,
pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for abortions."" 5 The Weldon
Amendment protects "health care entit[ies]," an expansive term
which includes hospitals, insurance plans, and HMOs. I1 6 Recently,
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has proposed
an interpretive rule following this definitional trend.' 17 The prolifera-
107 See Martha S. Swartz, "Conscience Clauses" or "Unconscionable Clauses": Personal
Beliefs Versus Professional Responsibilities, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 269, 283
(2006).
108 Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, § 515, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-245 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 238n).
109 Swartz, supra note 107, at 283.
110 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4001, 111 Stat. 251, 295
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(j) (3) (B)).
111 See Swartz, supra note 107, at 283 (citing Consolidated Appropriations Resolu-
tion, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, div. E, tit. II, 117 Stat. 11, 163).
112 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, §§ 507-508, 121
Stat. 1844, 2208-09 (2007). Sources alternatively refer to this legislation as the "Hyde
Amendment" and the "Hyde-Weldon Amendment."
113 Id. § 507, 121 Stat. at 2208.
114 Id. § 508(a), 121 Stat. at 2208.
115 Id. § 508(d) (1), 121 Stat. at 2209.
116 Id. § 508(d) (2), 121 Stat. at 2209.
117 See Rohit Talwar, Note, The Dangers of Broad Federal Conscience Law, 21 HEALTH
LAw., Aug. 2009, at 23, 25-30 (arguing against the breadth of HHS' proposed rule,
located at Ensuring that Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not
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tion of broadly defined conscience clauses brings more individuals
into a decision that would otherwise lie solely between a patient and
her doctor.
3. Clinical Morality
Physicians have their own claim to autonomy; in fact, autonomy
has been described as "the cornerstone of physician professional-
ism."' 18 However, as noted above, the flourishing of patient auton-
omy has diminished provider independence, inspiring complaints
that modern physicians have become mere vendors of requested med-
ical services. 119 A physician's autonomy is broader than merely a right
to refuse to perform certain procedures, which conscience clauses
firmly protect. Providers also have an interest in acting consistent
with best practices and prevailing medical ethics. In fact, widely
respected medical associations command healthcare providers to
observe certain principles in the practice of medicine, not dissimilar
from the requirements found within the Directives. The American
Medical Association's (AMA) eighth principle of medical ethics states
that "[a] physician shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibil-
ity to the patient as paramount." 120 The AMA's Policy on the Provi-
sion of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment reads:
As stated by our Code of Medical Ethics, the American Medical
Association believes that:
Life-sustaining treatments should provide medical benefits and
should respect a patient's preferences, as communicated by the
patient or a legally recognized surrogate .... Once initiated, life
sustaining treatments may be ethically withdrawn upon request of
the patient, or a surrogate or court acting on the patient's behalf.12 1
Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law,
73 Fed. Reg. 50,274-01, (Aug. 26, 2008) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 88.2 (2009)). The
trend persists is new legislation working its way through committee. A proposed addi-
tion to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 11-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010), expansively defines the healthcare entities to which its proposed funding,
training, and nondiscrimination provisions would apply. See H.R. 358, 112th Cong.
(2011).
118 Simon C. Mathews & Peter J. Pronovost, Physician Autonomy and Informed Deci-
sion Making: Finding the Balance for Patient Safety and Quality, 300 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
2913, 2913 (2008).
119 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
120 COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. Ass'N, CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCATION, at iii (2004).
121 AMA Policy on the Provision of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, AM. MED. ASS'N,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/about-eth-
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A report from the American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists (ACOG) ethics committee states that "[i]n an emergency in
which referral is not possible or might negatively have an impact on a
patient's physical or mental health, providers have an obligation to
provide medically indicated and requested care."122 It is easy to see
the conflict between these guidelines and the Directives.
The AMA's statements on medical ethics go beyond mere com-
mentary. They define what constitutes acceptable practice when
potential conflicts arise. When lethal injection emerged as a method
of execution preferable to electrocution, the AMA balked at any par-
ticipation by physicians. It swiftly adopted a resolution now embodied
in Article 2.06 of the AMA's 1992 Code of Medical Ethics, which states
that "[a] physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to preserv-
ing life when there is hope of doing so, should not be a participant in
a legally authorized execution."1 23 The AMA permitted physicians
only to provide sedatives to ease the prisoner's anxiety and to certify
death after another person had pronounced it. 124 The American
Nurses Association adopted a similar position.1 25 Very few physicians
will participate in executions at all and those that do limit their
involvement. For example, some participating physicians declined to
assist a hapless warden struggling to perform the injections. 126 Others
refused to personally pronounce death. 127 They were even reluctant
to discuss their involvement, despite a guarantee of anonymity. 128
Physicians manifest their clinical morality, a species of individual con-
science, when they refuse to participate in executions or strictly limit
their participation. Clinical morality also guides affirmative action,
exemplified by ACOG's command to perform all medically indicated
care in an emergency and by a physician's choice to participate in
ics-group/ethics-resource-center/end-f-ife-care/ama-policy-prvision-ife-sustaining-
medical.shtml (last visited June 20, 2011).
122 Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists Comm. on Ethics, Comm. Op. 385
(2007), available at http://www.acog.org/fromhome/publications/ethics/co385.pdf
(discussing the limits of conscientious refusal in reproductive medicine).
123 Atul Gawande, When Law and Ethics Collide-Why Physicians Participate in Execu-
tions, 354 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1221, 1222-23 (2006) (quoting Am. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS art 2.06 (1992)).
124 See id. at 1223.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See id.
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executions on a limited basis or to respect a patient's end-of-life
requests. 129
But conscience clauses do a poor job of protecting both facets of
clinical morality. In addition to protection for individuals, the
Church Amendment extended protection to institutions whose con-
science may very well conflict with that of its employees, creating an
internal inconsistency which subsequent conscience clauses have exac-
erbated by conferring conscience protection upon a more varied
group of entities, °30 all of which may assert conscience rights antago-
nistic to a physician's clinical morality. Institutional conscience is fun-
damentally different from individual conscience and has no place
among the pantheon of jealously guarded individual rights.
III. THE INCONSISTENCY OF INSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE
It is a weighty thing to recognize an individual's right to declare
that she is exempt from the operation of a law that is intended to bind
all of society. 131 Chaos follows closely behind a failure to carefully
limit such exceptions. State law and church law do not exist side by
side as equally valid systems of governance. No citizen is free to sub-
mit to secular law only to the extent that it does not conflict with relig-
ious edict,13 2 and conscience clauses provide only a limited exception
to this rule. Recognition of the right of healthcare providers to act
129 This is not to say that the AMA or ACOG should have their own right of con-
science. This would be just as problematic as imputing conscience to hospitals and
HMOs. Rather, the AMA and ACOG promulgate rules of ethical conduct, similar to
the Directives, which a physician may feel morally obliged to follow in her individual
capacity.
130 See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
131 Assertions of conscientious objection in the cases discussed in this Note must
be distinguished from the civil disobedience espoused and practiced most notably by
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Henry David Thoreau, and Mahatma Gandhi. A critical
component of civil disobedience is the willingness to accept the penalty for that diso-
bedience. As King argued, "an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him
is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the con-
science of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for
law." MARTIN LUTHER KING,JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 76,
83-84 (1964) (emphasis added). In the cases discussed here, those demanding con-
science protection seek what Ellen Goodman has called "conscience without conse-
quence." Ellen Goodman, Dispensing Morality: Pharmacists and Others Are Asking for
Conscience Without Consequence, KAN. CITY STAR, Apr. 13, 2005, at B7.
132 All who request the shelter of conscience clauses implicitly recognize this fact
by virtue of their appeal to secular law for protection.
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according to their consciences 133 must not be extended to institutions
without rigorously testing the justifications for doing so.
A. Theoretical Defects: Institutional Conscience in the Abstract
Even as a stand-alone concept, institutional conscience is prob-
lematic. How does an institution have a conscience?' 34 Entities are
imbued with personality and extended significant benefits by way of
legal fiction.1 35 And yet a legal fiction is just that-a fiction. Institu-
tional conscience is inherently derivative, taking form only through
the action of individuals.1 36 To the extent that it can be identified at
all,1 37 institutional conscience is no more than the amalgamated con-
science of the institution's directors. It is difficult to see how the con-
science of like-minded individuals is transformed into the cohesive
conscience of a fictitious entity.
Some respond that an institution is something more than simply
the sum of its parts.138 Ostensibly, such an argument concludes that
the synergistic effect of collective action creates a "something more"
which is equivalent to individual conscience. In short, an institution's
charter or ethical precepts, as the products of collective action, are its
133 Other professions do not receive such charitable treatment. Attorneys, for
example, are held to the same standard of practice regardless of the nature of their
clients. See Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of View, 15 YALEJ.L. &
HUMAN. 209, 216 (2003) ("Any account of legal ethics that is connected to a recogniz-
ably adversary conception of legal process will acknowledge that lawyers must prefer
their clients over others in a manner that would ordinarily be immoral .... ").
134 See Kent Greenawalt, Objections in Conscience to Medical Procedures: Does Religion
Make a Difference?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 824 ("[I]t is somewhat difficult to say what
gives a collective entity an objection in conscience . . ").
135 See Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14
J. LEGAL MED. 177, 186 (1993).
136 See Moreland, supra note 18, at 226 ("[I] nstitutional conscience ... will always
be derivative-and problematically so-of the language of individual conscience.").
Here, Moreland suggests that the problem is linguistic-that "the language of 'con-
science' undermines a robust understanding of church autonomy." Id. However, as
the discussion below makes clear, the problems posed by institutional conscience run
far deeper than a simplistic terminological difficulty.
137 This is not at all problematic in the case of Catholic hospitals as the Directives
constitute an explicit iteration of Catholic teaching with respect to healthcare
institutions.
138 See Robert K. Vischer, When Is a Catholic Doing Legal Theory Doing "Catholic Legal
Theoiy?, "40 SETON HALL L. REv. 845, 857 (2010) ("The corporation's moral identity is
not simply the sum of its parts; the corporation needs discretion to shape its own
identity.").
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conscience.13 9 Not only does this argument depend on some ill-
defined alchemy to transform collective action into conscience, but it
also relies on the unwarranted supposition that, because a corporate
charter and an individual's conscience share some general character-
istics, the analogy is perfect. The analogy is decidedly imperfect.
Institutional charters or ethical precepts lack some of the fundamen-
tal characteristics of conscience enumerated above. 140 Taking Catho-
lic hospitals as an example, there are serious difficulties with the
argument that the Directives are distinctively human. They are cer-
tainly the product of human creation, but they do not reflect individ-
ual, private judgment. Instead, they reflect layered judgment:
Centuries of Catholic teaching combine with the Pope's authoritative
leadership to provide a framework within which a group of bishops
(the USCCB) determines rules. A diocesan bishop interprets those
rules and a hospital ethics committee applies them to individual cases.
Furthermore, the compulsion to act or not act arising from institu-
tional conscience differs from the compulsion arising from individual
conscience because the interaction between the conscience and the
act is not self-contained-institutional conscience instead imposes
obligations on others.1 41 This is not to say that collective action cre-
ates nothing that transcends the individual. Christopher Kutz aptly
describes the social dynamics. 14 2 But to equate any transcendence to
conscience is an unjustified leap, with serious implications.
139 See Pellegrino, supra note 16, at 235 ("The ethical 'code' or commitment of a
specific institution is now customarily expressed in its mission statement. This is in a
way the 'conscience' of the institution.").
140 See supra Part 1.B.1.
141 Although superficially applicable, the question of institutional conscience does
not fit into the corporate personality debate because that debate considers the extent
to which a corporation shares in the rights granted to a natural person. SeeJess M.
Krannich, The Corporate "Person ": A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 61-62 (2005) ("[A] corporation is simply
not a 'person' as most understand the term. To overcome this dichotomy, corporate
theorists have devised various metaphors to help supply a legal definition for the cor-
porate entity .... The use of metaphorical descriptions of the corporate entity is
especially prevalent in the Supreme Court's corporate constitutional jurisprudence.
The Court's decisions in this area seem to assume that a corporation is a 'person'
under the Constitution and is thus entitled to many of the same rights as a natural
person." (footnote omitted)). But in the circumstances under discussion, investing a
hospital with conscience does more than place it on an equal plane with natural per-
sons-it elevates the hospital by permitting it to impose its conscience on others.
142 See CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY 72 (2000) ("[G]roup identity is explained
in terms of individual participatory intentions ... [which] include not just inchoate,
romantic feelings of group solidarity, but a willingness to assume obligations taken on
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In his oft-cited article, Professor Lynn D. Wardle makes two more
objections to differentiating between individual and institutional con-
science. First, he argues that denying institutional conscience is an
indirect method of denying individual conscience protection to the
institution's creators, which "contradicts the central purpose of con-
science clauses.' 43 In fact, a complete recognition of individual con-
science can only be achieved by denying institutional conscience,
144
because institutional conscience, by imposing its commands on third
parties, actually encroaches on individual conscience. The loss of con-
science protection for the institution's creators, which would result
from eliminating institutional conscience, is not a defect; it simply
reveals the creators' tenuous relation to the actual provision of medi-
cal care. Moreover, Wardle's concern that removing institutional con-
science protection injures the institution's creators, and not the
institution itself, is a tacit admission that an entity's conscience is not
truly distinct from the aggregated conscience of its directors or
creators.
Second, Wardle argues that permitting individual but not institu-
tional conscience cannot be reconciled with other legal doctrines like
First Amendment protection for individual and collective speech. 4
5
This argument misrepresents the two interests at stake. Free speech
doctrine defines the law in its primary form, whereas conscience
clauses are secondary exemptions from the law's operation. The pri-
mary rights to which citizens are entitled are not inherently suspect.
On the contrary, the right of free speech and its ilk express cherished
and generally applicable principles.146 For this reason, extending free
by other group members, to speak, decide, and act on others' behalf, and to deliber-
ate about how best to act so as to further collective plans and intentions.").
143 Wardle, supra note 135 at 186.
144 The burden that denying institutional conscience places on, for example, a
Catholic hospital's directors is no different from the burden that the directors of a
secular hospital bear when a physician at the hospital acts, on the basis of religious or
moral belief, in a manner which the director finds unconscionable.
145 Wardle, supra note 135, at 187.
146 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) ("The
right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consen-
sus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect
it.... Premised on a mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands
against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints."). Wardle also chides as
ironic a state's assertion that a hospital either does not have a conscience or is not
entitled to express or implement it because it is not a natural person. See Wardle,
supra note 135, at 186. "After all," he continues, "a state is not a human being either,
but merely an entity created to express and enforce collective will." Id. at 186-87.
But of course, the state is not acting on the basis of conscience, but rather utilizing
the governmental authority that the citizenry has conferred upon it.
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speech to institutions is less worrisome than expanding exceptions to
a general rule. These exceptions are disquieting by their very nature
and are thus only grudgingly broadened. Wardle's use of a primary
right like free speech to set the standard for expanding conscience
protection is misleading because it measures the scope of a narrowly
tailored exception by a yardstick reserved for first principles. For
these reasons, the very idea of institutional conscience as a freestand-
ing structure sags atop buckling theoretical pillars.
B. Conflict with Individual Conscience
Institutional conscience protection is also dubious in its practical
application because it impinges on and overrides individual con-
science. Even if one rejected the fundamental characteristics of con-
science proposed above, created a different set of criteria to describe
conscience, and on this basis decided that the Directives do represent a
Catholic hospital's institutional conscience, this would only support
the conclusion that institutions and individuals have an equal right to
conscience protection. And yet, in the current legal landscape, insti-
tutional conscience wins out when the two conflict. It is this supersed-
ing characteristic of institutional conscience as currently recognized
that is least defensible. 47
By permitting a Catholic hospital to dictate the treatments a phy-
sician may prescribe, a Catholic healthcare institution's "conscience"
takes primacy over the physician's clinical morality. A non-Catholic
healthcare provider practicing in a Catholic hospital does not have
the same freedom of individual conscience that is enjoyed by others
who do not work in Catholic hospitals. A Catholic who works in a
Catholic hospital may still experience this conflict if she fundamen-
tally disagrees with, but is obliged to follow, a bishop's or ethics com-
mittee's interpretation of the Directives. In this respect, the derivative
nature of institutional conscience takes on greater significance. The
Directives were written by the USCCB and are interpreted by local bish-
ops, neither of which is a "healthcare provider" under federal con-
science legislation.1 48 But a grant of institutional conscience gives this
group not simply a right of conscience equal to direct providers
(despite their very unequal participation), but a superior claim to con-
science protection, since employees at Catholic hospitals must abide
147 Even more troubling is that the superseding nature of institutional conscience
is only selectively given. Religious physicians' right of refusal would exist in theory
only if a secular institution was permitted to declare a moral objection to denying
patients any treatment that is medically indicated and consistent with best practices.
148 See supra Part II.B.2.
1 68o [VOL. 86:4
THE CASE AGAINST INSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE
by the Directives, regardless of their religious persuasion or clinical
morality. Therefore, institutional conscience provides individuals
only tangentially related to the actual provision of medical services a
right to dictate treatment options to providers and patients. And yet
this imposition of values is precisely what conscience clause advocates
deplore when they support an individual Catholic physician's broad
right of refusal, even when contrary to hospital policy.149
That inconsistent message is symptomatic of a deeper problem:
the practical application of institutional conscience is asymmetrical.
An entity cannot assert a right of conscience without first identifying
that conscience. A Catholic hospital has, in the Directives, a compre-
hensive set of moral rules it can claim as its conscience. This means
that a Catholic hospital can demand that its employees abide by the
Directives, notwithstanding those employees' countervailing clinical
morality. But secular hospitals generally have no analog to the Direc-
tives. Without comprehensive moral rules of its own to assert, a secular
hospital must accommodate the conscience-based refusals of its staff.
Thus, institutional conscience operates as a one-way ratchet protect-
ing the rights of religious providers and institutions at the expense of
their secular counterparts.
Advocates of conscience protection for Catholic hospitals and
providers must, by definition, refuse to accept that the justifications
for either protection cut both ways. All of the arguments in favor of
protecting an individual provider's right to object over her employer's
policy cut against recognizing the hospital's right to impose its policy
against the moral objection of an employee. But this is precisely the
imposition to which such advocates object when imposed on Catholic
employees. This is the fundamental hypocrisy on which federal con-
science legislation rests.
149 See Edward T. Mechmann, Illusion or Protection? Free Exercise Rights and Laws
Mandating Insurance Coverage of Contraception, 41 CATH. LAw. 145, 166 (2001) ("A con-
science clause amendment to ERISA would thus bar state governments from imposing
morally-offensive mandates on employee benefit plans."); Melissa Duvall, Comment,
Pharmacy Conscience Clause Statutes: Constitutional Religious "Accommodations" or Unconsti-
tutional "Substantial Burdens" on Women?, 55 AM. U. L. Rv. 1485, 1507 (2006)
("[S]ome pharmacy conscience clause provisions ... clearly remove the burden that
pharmacy laws impose on Catholic and other religious pharmacists who believe that
life begins at conception."); Jessica J. Nelson, Comment, Freedom of Choice for Everyone:
The Need for Conscience Clause Legislation for Pharmacists, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 139, 162
(2005) ("Forcing a pharmacist to provide a medication that the pharmacist believes
will lead to the death of a person is imposing the patient's views onto the pharmacist,
not the other way around."). This inconsistency is particularly troubling, as it creates
the appearance of advocates seeking merely to protect the primacy of their religious
values, whatever the argument needed to reach that result.
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Some resolve the inconsistency by treating a religious justification
for a refusal as having special weight, rendering it superior to objec-
tions cast purely in moral or ethical terms. 150 On this understanding,
the religion-based conscience of the institution has priority over the
morality-based objection of an individual physician. But the justifica-
tions for protecting faith-based conscience do not vanish when the
conscience is instead based in morality. Moreover, the moral weight
of an objection is not necessarily greater because it is based in relig-
ious teaching. Kent Greenawalt writes: "Because the great majority of
existing refusal laws do not single out religious conscience . . . and
because some nonreligious persons will have strong moral reasons not
to participate in certain medical procedures, general privileges to
refuse should not be limited to religious claimants." 151 Practical diffi-
culties also counsel against giving more weight to religious objection.
An exemption applicable only to faith-based objections could, by giv-
ing preference to religious ideas, run afoul of the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause. 152 Then there is the added problem of deter-
mining what constitutes a religion. Although this is less persuasive, as
courts must confront this question in any freedom of religion claim, it
is a practical problem that should not be needlessly confronted.
Finally, there is the argument that those who do not want to be
subject to the Directives should not work at Catholic hospitals. 153 Ironi-
cally, advocates for faith-based conscience protection quite rightly
rejected the nearly identical argument 54 that Catholic physicians
should find a specialty that does not implicate the conflicts between
their faith and the prevailing best practices. 155 It is hard to see a prin-
150 See Pellegrino, supra note 16, at 224-25.
151 Greenawalt, supra note 134, at 824; see also Vischer, supra note 138, at 857
(" [W]e should hesitate to legitimize religiously derived claims of conscience over
other types ....").
152 See Greenawalt, supra note 134, at 823 (noting that conscience clauses that
create "[e]xcessive imposition might... violate the Establishment Clause. An exemp-
tion cast directly in religious terms is most clearly vulnerable in this respect,"). The
Establishment Clause ensures religious liberty by requiring government action to have
a true secular purpose; laws that lack such a purpose are invalid. See Andrew D.
Cohen, Note, How the Establishment Clause Can Influence Substantive Due Process: Adultery
Bans After Lawrence, 79 FoPDHn L. REV. 101, 121-22 (2010).
153 This argument was suggested to me by Professor O.C. Snead, Associate Profes-
sor of Law at the University of Notre Dame Law School.
154 SeeJulie D. Cantor, Conscientious Objection Gone Awry-Restoring Selfless Profession-
alism in Medicine, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1484, 1485 (2009) ("Qualms about abortion,
sterilization, and birth control? Do not practice women's health. Believe that the
human body should be buried intact? Do not become a transplant surgeon. Morally
opposed to pain medication . . . ? Do not train to be an intensivist.").
155 See Greenawalt, supra note 131, at 820.
1682 [VOL. 86:4
THE CASE AGAINST INSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE
cipled distinction between applying the if-you-don't-like-it-leave argu-
ment to a physical area (i.e., a particular hospital), but rejecting its
application to a practice area. Measuring the relative burden of mov-
ing between specialties against moving to a different employer or area
of the country is an individual calculus that will vary with the circum-
stances. No matter how it comes out in a particular instance, it pro-
vides little defense for any general rule. Furthermore, it is
undesirable to require that a person forego a major vocational option
in order to abide by her conscience. As Greenawalt noted, "the gov-
ernment should not create conditions that force individuals and orga-
nizations long committed to [ministering to the sick] to give it up."1 56
Society at large has an interest in preventing the Balkanization of the
medical profession, where institutions or geographic areas tolerate
only like-minded individuals.
IV. SOLUTION
The problem posed by institutional conscience's impingement
on individual conscience has been recognized before. Professor Rob-
ert Vischer dismisses the problem entirely "as the price of the corpora-
tion's mediating role."'157 This response does nothing to resolve the
problem and is at odds with Vischer's endorsement of individual con-
science protection.1 58 The logical extension of Vischer's argument
would conclude that the "price of the corporation's mediating role"
also requires a Catholic physician to abide by a secular hospital's poli-
cies even when they contravene her religious values, a result Vischer
opposes. 159 Evading the issue is not a viable option.
Others suggest the Church Amendment as a vehicle for denying
institutions the right to infringe on physicians' clinical morality. 160
The language of the Church Amendment does purport to protect
from discrimination a physician who performs a procedure to which a
hospital objects. 161 However, this protection would be limited to ster-
ilizations and abortions, the only procedures covered by the Church
Amendment. 162 More importantly, the Church Amendment does not
create a private right of action, as numerous courts have held.1 63
156 Id.
157 Vischer, supra note 138, at 857.
158 See id. at 850.
159 See id.
160 See Eisenstadt, supra note 5, at 155-72.
161 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
163 See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120 (RJD), 2010 WL
169485, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) ("The Court finds no basis for implying a pri-
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Without a private right of action physicians would have to rely on the
federal government to protect their clinical morality. But the govern-
ment's consistent expansion of institutional conscience indicates a
definite lack of concern for institutional infringement on physicians'
clinical morality. Therefore, the Church Amendment is not a promis-
ing avenue for relief.
Still others suggest the charitable trust doctrine as a source of
protection, but here, too, standing presents a challenge. A charitable
trust "is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property arising as a
result of a manifestation of an intention to create it, and subjecting
the person by whom the property is held to equitable duties to deal
with the property for a charitable purpose. 1 64 A charitable trust is
believed to create a "social contract between the charity and the pub-
lic beneficiaries."' 1 65 In Elizabeth, NewJersey, the town's only two hos-
pitals, one secular and one Catholic, merged to form a new entity,
which agreed to abide by the Directives.166 The Attorney General of
New Jersey required the hospitals to get leave of the court before con-
tinuing with the merger.' 67 When the hospitals filed their complaint
with the court, the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey
(ACLU-NJ) intervened as a party in interest.168 The court agreed with
the ACLU-NJ that the merger might constitute a change in the hospi-
tal's charitable mission. 169 This favorable preliminary ruling gave the
ACLU-NJ sufficient bargaining power to negotiate a settlement, which
ensured that those services no longer offered at the hospital would
remain available to the community. 170
vate right of action under the Church Amendment."); Nead v. Bd. of Trs. of E. Ill.
Univ., No. 05-2137, 2006 WL 1582454, at *5 (C.D. I1. June 6, 2006) ("The defendants
argue that the Church Amendment does not confer a private right of action. The
defendants are correct; it does not."); Moncivaiz v. Dekalb Cnty., No. 03 C 50226,
2004 WL 539994, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2004) ("The [Church Amendment] does
not create an express private right of action .... ).
164 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959).
165 Alison Manolovici Cody, Note, Success in New Jersey: Using the Charitable Trust
Doctrine to Preserve Women's Reproductive Services When Hospitals Become Catholic, 57 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. Am. L. 323, 341 (2000) (quoting OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF N.H.,
REPORT ON OPTIMA HEALTH 9 (1998)).
166 See id. at 334-35.
167 See id. at 336.
168 See id. at 336-37.
169 See id. at 338.
170 See id.
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Although successful in New Jersey,1 71 New Hampshire, 172 and
New York, 173 the charitable trust doctrine has serious limitations.
First, only a public officer-usually the attorney general-has stand-
ing to sue. 174 Attorneys general might not be motivated to intervene
or may lack the resources to do so. 1 75 An attorney general may also be
wary of tackling such a politically charged issue. 176 Beneficiaries often
find it very difficult to meet the "special interest" standing exception
utilized by the ACLU-NJ. 177 Therefore, the charitable trust doctrine is
also an unsuitable shield.
In this case, the most obvious solution is the best one. Legislative
conscience clauses must remove protection for institutions, which is
illogical, damaging, and theoretically unsound. This is the simplest
and best means to protect the full spectrum of individual conscience.
CONCLUSION
Catholic healthcare institutions have emerged from the rash of
hospital mergers in the 1980s and 1990s with an expansive presence in
the United States. This is a blessing in some contexts and deeply divi-
sive in others. Catholic hospitals and their employees are required to
follow the Directives, a set of rules promulgated by the USCCB, for the
moral operation of a Catholic healthcare institution. Inevitably, fric-
tion results when a physician's clinical morality conflicts with the Direc-
tives' commands.
A physician's right to make autonomous decisions has long been
under siege with respect to patients, who currently enjoy broad rights
of autonomy. Forced adherence to the Directives represents pressure
from the opposite direction. In order to protect some vestige of physi-
cian autonomy American legislatures passed conscience clauses,
which recognize a right of conscience for physicians. These same stat-
utes also extend protection to institutions, imputing to the institution
the same conscience recognized in natural persons.
Even as an isolated concept, institutional conscience is problem-
atic. Unlike its individual counterpart, institutional conscience does
not have the qualities that make conscience protection vital. To use
Catholic hospitals as an example, while the Directives are certainly the
171 See generally id. at 323-59 (describing an instance in which the charitable trust
doctrine prevented a merger between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals).
172 See id. at 344-45.
173 See id. at 346-47.
174 See id. at 347.
175 See id. at 348-49.
176 See id. at 349.
177 See id. at 349-50.
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product of human creation, they reflect the layered judgment of Cath-
olic teaching, the Pope's leadership, and the interpretations of local
bishops and ethics committees, as opposed to the private, personal
judgment characteristic of individual conscience. Furthermore, the
Directives command to act or not act differs from the compulsion aris-
ing from individual conscience because the interaction between the
conscience and the act is not self-contained; institutional conscience is
instead imposed on third parties.
Even more problematic is the trump card which institutional con-
science gives to individuals, like local bishops or hospital administra-
tors, whose indirect relation to the actual provision of medical services
would otherwise render their opinion irrelevant to a medical decision
made by a patient and her doctor. Even assuming that institutions
were properly imbued with the conscience of individuals, this utterly
fails to explain why the religious institution's derivative conscience
supersedes a physician's individual conscience when the two conflict.
In fact, those who support a Catholic physician's right to refuse to
offer medically indicated treatment must admit the supremacy of the
individual physician's conscience protection. And yet these same sup-
porters advocate the reverse, an institutional trump of individual con-
science, when a Catholic hospital obliges a non-Catholic physician to
adhere to the Directives, contrary to the physician's clinical morality.
This is the intrinsic hypocrisy of modern conscience legislation.
Neither the Church Amendment nor the charitable trust doc-
trine is likely to rectify this inconsistency. The Church Amendment
does not create a private right of action and, given its expanding rec-
ognition of institutional conscience, the federal government cannot
be relied upon to protect physician's clinical morality. Suit under the
charitable trust doctrine can be maintained only by a public officer or
those with a "special interest." Public officers are unlikely to wade
into such a controversial issue and therefore cannot be counted on to
rigorously protect clinical morality. Beneficiaries have difficulty quali-
fying as a "special interest." In order to truly recognize and protect
the full range of individual conscience, institutional conscience must
be excised from conscience legislation.
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